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LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr-CoVERAGE OF CoNsTRucnoN
WORKERS-Respondent construction firm was engaged in building a dam,
the sole purpose of which was to enlarge a reservoir that supplied water to
the city of Corpus Christi, Texas. Industrial producers of goods for interstate commerce and operators of instrumentalities of interstate commerce
consumed nearly half of the water supplied by the city's system. The Secretary of Labor sought an injunction against violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act1 The district court granted the
injunction; the court of appeals reversed, 2 relying primarily upon the "new
construction" doctrine. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting. Although the new construction rule
was not a proper basis upon which to deny coverage, construction workers
in this case, nevertheless, were too remotely related to the production goods
for interstate commerce to come within the scope of the act. .Mitchell v.
H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
The FLSA governs a segment of labor law in which Congress has chosen
to exercise a jurisdiction less extensive than that available to it under the
commerce clause.a Since the passage of the act in 1938, the courts have
tended to expand the boundaries of its application. During the past
seven years this has been particularly true in the construction industry.
In the principal case, however, the Court takes a restrictive view of further
expansion of federal wage and hour regulation. In doing so the Court completes the unfinished picture left in 1955 by its decision in Mitchell v.
Vollmer! and clarifies the distinction between the two branches of coverage
of individual workers: those engaged "in commerce" within the meaning of
section 3(b) of the act and those employed "in the production of goods for
commerce" under section 3 G).
The distinction between these two branches is central to the history of
the application of the FLSA. Early litigation under the act dealt primarily
with the more general "production" wording of section 3 (j) and resulted

152 Stat. 1061 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
2 H.B. Zachry Co. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959).
a Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (dictum).
4 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
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in the extension of coverage to employees connected by an indirect causal
relationship to interstate operations.5 On the other hand, "in commerce"
coverage was at first limited to operational employees immediately concerned with the movement of goods. 6 Then, in Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp.,7 the Court drew upon an old Federal Employers' Liability Act decision8 to extend "in commerce" coverage to maintenance employees. In one
respect this proved an unfortunate importation, for within FELA jurisprudence was a doctrine, resulting from a narrow interpretation of the
commerce clause, that construction of new facilities did not come within
the reach of Congress before the facilities were actually placed in service.9
Through Overstreet, this "new construction rule" became embedded in the
FLSA decisions of the lower courts as a limitation on the scope of the phrase
"in commerce.''10 By further importation, the rule also became a limitation
on "production of goods" coverage.11
In 1955 Mitchell v. Vollmer12 summarily dismissed the new construction
rule as belonging to "another vintage." This decision was the culmination
of a gradual expansion of application of the FLSA to construction activities. Expansion had followed two routes: first, an attempt to use the
broader concept of "production of goods" to reach suppliers of construction materials for transportation facilities; 13 and, second, examination of
the degree of integration which a facility under construction would have
with existing facilities when completed rather than during its construction,u a technique built upon the traditional "improvement" exception
li E.g., Kirschbaum v. Walling, supra note 3, at 524, in which the Court held that
operating and maintenance employees of the owner of a loft building, space in which was
rented to persons producing goods principally for interstate commerce, performed work
"necessary to the production of goods for commerce."
6 Higgins v. Carr Bros., 317 U.S. 572 (1943); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317
U.S. 564 (1943); Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
7 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
s Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 229 U.S. 146 (1913).
o Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 243 U.S. 43 (1917).
10 E.g., Van Klaveren v. Killian-House Co., 210 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1954); Scholl v.
McWilliams Dredging Co., 169 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1948); Nieves v. Standard Dredging Co.,
152 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court impliedly recognized the doctrine in
Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U.S. 720 (1945). Construction workers were given special
treatment in Murphy v. Reed, 335 U.S. 865 (1948). Mr. Justice Rutledge's partial dissent
shows that some consideration was given to the status of new construction at that time.
11 E.g., Spencer v. Porter, 183 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1950); Parham v. Austin Co., 158 F.2d
566 (5th Cir. 1946); Hartmaier v. Long, 361 Mo. 1151, 238 S.W.2d 332, cert. denied, 342
U.S. 833 (1951). For an extreme example of differentiation between the "in commerce"
and tl1e "production of goods" phraseology, see Schroeder v. Clifton, 153 F.2d 385 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 858 (1946), holding disapproved, H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949).
12 Supra note 4, at 429.
13Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Thomas v. Hempt, 345 U.S. 19
(1953); Tobin v. Johnson, 198 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 915 (1953).
14 l\litchell v. Chambers Constr. Co., 214 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1954); Bennett v. V. P.
Loftis Co., 167 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1948); Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 156 F.2d 932
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946); Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134
F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1943).
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to the new construction doctrine. The Vollmer decision followed the latter
of these two approaches. It did not categorically abolish the new construction exception to coverage;15 rather, it expanded the test of integration
with existing facilities to a point where little construction "in commerce"
could be imagined which would be sufficiently independent to be "new.''16
Vollmer did not make clear whether its broader concept of integration
would also be applicable to "production of goods" litigation, the older
arena of FLSA contention in which integration with existing facilities is a
far less frequent factor and into which the new construction doctrine entered only indirectly from the FELA decisions. Unlike the expanding
"in-commerce" jurisdiction, the once-broader section 3 G), "production of
goods," branch was restricted in 1949 by an amendment which substituted
"directly essential" for "necessary" in describing the relationship between
covered activities and the production for commerce itself.1 7 The Court had
not previously dealt with this amendment.1s
Dictum in the Zachry decision appears to confirm the thesis that Vollmer
destroyed the new construction rule. At the same time, however, when
coverage is predicated on section 3 G), the fact that the activities involve
construction remains a relevant factor in determining the issue of remoteness within the 1949 amendment.19 In essence, the Court in Zachry confirms
the "factor" approach suggested by the Wage and Hour Administrator. 20
The facts of the principal case indicate that three factors will be particularly
important in predicting coverage: (1) Whether the facility is to be used
"in commerce" or for "the production of goods for commerce.'' If the
former, the construction is one degree more closely related to commerce
proper. Moreover, the restrictive effect of the 1949 amendment is not encountered. There is no reason to doubt that the expanding coverage indicated by Vollmer2 1 will continue in this area. However, it appears that
15 But

see Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493, 500 (1956) (dictum).

16 E.g., new buildings to house radio guidance systems are integrated with the existing
system of aerial navigational aids. Mitchell v. Southwestern Eng'r Co., 170 F. Supp. 310
(W.D. Mo. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1959). Cf. Archer v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1957). The verbal formula for determining
jurisdiction in relation to commerce, "so closely related to it as to be practically a part of
it," has remained unchanged since Shanks v. Delaware, L. 8: W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556, 558
(1916) (FELA case). Compare McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497 (1943), and
Mitchell v. Vollmer, supra note 4.
17 63 Stat. 911 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1958). In interpreting this legislation, the
majority in Zachry rely primarily on the House managers' report, H.R. REP. No. 1453,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). The Senate managers did not join in this report, but rather
filed a separate report after the Senate had passed the bilJ, 95 CoNG. REc. 14875 (1949), on
which the Zachry dissent places more emphasis.
18 Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254 . (1955), would have denied
coverage even without the 1949 amendment.
19 This method of dealing with construction activities was foreseen in '\VECHT, 'WAGEHouR LAw, COVERAGE 252 (1951).
20 29 C.F.R. § 776.17 (c) (2) (Supp. 1960).
21 Supra note 4. Mitchell v. Lublin M,'cGaughy, 358 U.S. 207 (1959), ilJustrates a
more recent application of this approach.
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not all facilities furnishing support to interstate instrumentalities will themselves be considered "in commerce" and therefore subjected to federal wage
and hour regulation, for in Zachry the Court attaches little weight to the
fact that the water was to be used to a small extent by railroads, airlines,
and other instrumentalities of commerce. On the other hand, if the facility
under construction is to be used for "the production of goods for commerce," Vollmer dictates that construction alone does not preclude coverage
of activities; rather, the interaction of remaining factors will govern the
degree of remoteness from commerce. (2) The number of steps separating
the completed facility from "the production of goods for commerce." The
dam under construction in Zachry would, inter alia, support factories. Still
undecided is the degree of remoteness involved in the construction of
factories themselves, an activity that is one step closer to commerce proper
than the Zachry dam. The administrator continues to refuse to regard the
fact that construction is "new" as in itself determinative of coverage.22 The
only recent case found in point23 proceeds upon the theory that Vollmer
dealt only with "in-commerce" construction activities; this interpretation
was invalidated by Zachry. In place of the indiscriminate "new-construction" test, it is submitted that the issue of "remoteness" raised now in the
Zachry approach should be judged by balancing the degree to which the
wage and hour policy followed during its construction is reflected in the
pricing of a finished product in interstate competition, against the undesirable interference with a local labor market which is likely to result from
federal regulation. (3) The relation of the completed facility to existing
units or facilities. Under the traditional new construction doctrine, the dam
in the principal case might have been classed as improvement of the existing
reservoir.24 However, with the disappearance of that doctrine, whether the
thing constructed is totally new, an improvement, or a replacement becomes merely another factor to consider in determining remoteness. Zachry
distinguishes construction from repair, noting that the latter is more
nearly an integral part of operation. Nevertheless, the Court appears to
leave open the possibility that even repair might be considered noncovered employment in some projects distantly related to commerce; the
Court assumes only "arguendo that maintenance and repair of the completed dam would be covered employment...."25 Two questions of degree
are relevant: how radically is the existing facility changed, and how immediate is the effect of wage and hour policy on the price of an eventual
product? Closely related is the contention, argued and rejected in a
district court,20 that integration is not to be defined in mere physical terms,
22 29 C.F.R. §§ 776.26, !2.7 (c) (1) (Supp. 1960).
2S Mitchell v. Tune, 178 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
24 Walling v. Mccrady, supra note 14.
25 Principal case at 319. But see 29 C.F.R. § 776.27 (a)

Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949).
26 Mitchell v. Tune, supra note 23.

(Supp. 1960) and Farmers
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but should also include planned use of the completed facility in an existing
physically-diversified complex of production plants performing steps in the
manufacture of a product for commerce. It is possible, of course, that this
issue would never be reached, for construction of a primary facility of production might itself be covered. If such construction is not automatically
covered, then the degree of integration with a production sequence would
also be a factor to consider in determining remoteness within the act's
"production of goods" language.
The construction industry represents a particularly complex area for
the application of principles of federalism to labor law. In 1957 FLSA
covered less than half of all construction workers.27 However, covered and
non-covered construction activities are closely related because of the
pattern of employee mobility and area-wide collective bargaining between
associations of diversified contractors and individual construction unions.28
As a result of these special circumstances, federal regulation of some projects
has a more direct effect on other purely local practices than it might if there
were a more stable employment pattern. This situation justifies the unwillingness of the Court to abandon entirely the differential treatment
which in the past has been accorded the construction industry. The general
approach taken by the majority in Zachry appears to call for a balancing of
federal and state interests, with greater weight given to the states' interests
than would be required by the Constitution. Liberal interpretation of the
commerce clause has furnished a vehicle for assertion of broad federal power
in the general field of labor regulation; any attempt to preserve a role for
the states must rest on congressional legislation, and more particularly on
judicial policy operating within necessarily broad legislative mandates.20
Perhaps the principal case represents a guidepost for a more precise judicial
definition of a balanced federal-state relationship in labor law.so
David G. Davies

27 1,293,000 of a total of 2,909,000 construction workers were covered, according to
figures compiled from Wage and Hour Division sources. Hearings on S.25 [et al.] Before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public JVelfare, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1959).
28 Covington, Union Security Elections in the Building and Construction Industry
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 IND. 8: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 543, 546-48 (1951).
29 Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1297, 1347 (1954).
Wage and hour regulation is less subject to the criticism of an imbalance between federal
and state power than other more critical fields of labor legislation for several reasons:
First, the choice is between federal law and either complementary state law or no state law
at all, not between conflicting solutions. Professor Cox's recognition of the unfortunate
equation of states' rights with inaction, id. at 1302, 1346, is particularly appropriate.
Second, since the FLSA is administered by both federal and state courts and affords
private remedies, there is little problem of the administrative over-expansion experienced
in the early days of the NLRB, id. at 1300. Third, an objective of federal wage and hour
legislation is to affect indirectly conditions in non-covered areas. Scrupulous delineation
of federal and state domains serves only to delay the impact of federal standards upon the
latter.
so In 1960 Congress considered legislation that would have affected coverage of the
Fl.SA in the construction industry. S. 3758, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), proposed by

